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Ransomware remains a modern trend. Attackers are still us-
ing cryptovirology forcing victims to pay. Notable attacks
have been spreading since 2012, starting with Reveton’s ran-
somware attack to the more recent 2017 WannaCry, Petya
and Bad Rabbit cyberattacks. This Ransomware as a Service
(RaaS) can lure criminals into developing tools to perform
an attack without previous knowledge of the cryptosystem
itself. We present in this paper a graph-based ransomware
countermeasure to detect malicious threads. It is a newmech-
anism that doesn’t rely on previously used metrics in the
literature to detect ransomware such as Shannon’s entropy
or system calls. An accurate detection is achieved by our
solution. The per-thread file system traversal is sufficient to
highlight the malicious behaviors. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no previous study has been conducted in this area. The
ransomware collection used in our experiments contains
more than 700 active examples of ransomware, that were
analyzed in our bar metal sandbox environment.
KEYWORDS
Intrusion Detection System, Ransomware, File System Tra-
versal/Monitoring
1 INTRODUCTION
The first ransomware appeared in 1989. Since 2012, the num-
ber of ransomware victims has increased significantly. As
shown in the survey [1], different ransomware exist as Reve-
ton, CryptoLocker, CryptoWall and WannaCry. The ran-
somware as a service field enables any individual to launch
his/her own developed attack without a previous profound
knowledge of the target system. It represents a major rea-
son for this business growth. Ransomware payload not only
attacks computers but also cellphones as described in [2].
There is a high demand to mitigate ransomware infection
process. Indeed, it is no longer affecting users’ personal data
or computer, but it actually undermines many public ser-
vices. For example, a hospital has been hit by ransomware
and its servers have been encrypted exposing more than
9k patients[3]. Symantec, one of the leading cyber security
companies worldwide, has been able to block in the first half
of 2017, 319k ransomware as shown in their annual report
2017[4].
Motivation. Our motivation to join this arms race against
malware is the increased number of attacks in recent years
and the polymorphism of such malware registered by an-
tivirus software and, therefore, went undetected/unmitigated
in early stages.
What makes criminal exposure even harder is the use
of cryptocurrency such as bitcoin for the trade, which is
nearly impossible to trace. It remains a valid model since
attackers are peer pressuring victims who are willing to pay
any amount to retrieve their data. To make matters even
worse, evasion techniques are spreading at a high rate. It
is a challenge for antivirus software to adjust to the ongo-
ing ransomware evolution. This kind of global economy is
beneficial for cybercriminals and is fed by people’s lack of
information about spam mails and other mechanisms that
enable the spread of ransomware at a very high rate.
In the ransomware battle, one main goal is to restrain file
losses if no prior detection was achievable. Current detection
mechanisms rely on limiting the number of lost files, after the
encryption phase, by blocking any process that has similar
behavior/features to one of a ransomware(API calls, Reg-
istry keys, Embedded strings in binaries, etc). Nonetheless,
residual risks still exist. One assumption could be outlined:
no alarm is raised prior to any suspicious behavior. That
being said, if a prevention mechanism is not able to detect a
malicious software while it is still in its “footprinting” phase,
other precautions are compulsory to prevent and restrain
further damage and data loss in the system.
Therefore, countermeasures are necessary to limit mal-
ware impact. Moreover, in order to ensure an efficient de-
tection, countermeasures should not be present in the user
space as they usually are but rather in kernel space, therefore
having at least the same privileges as the latter.
Contribution. The first step in prevention mechanisms is
previous knowledge of existent threats encountered by a
user to mitigate them as soon as possible. Being a particular
part of malware’s family, a ransomware cannot go unnoticed.
Indeed, its end is very clear and noticeable by the victim
since this malware will lock/encrypt the files of the victim
until a ransom is paid.
This paper introduces a ransomware detection technique
that serves as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). More
precisely, it targets crypto-ransomware since it presents a
higher threat than cryptoLocker.
It is based on a file system exploration, before the attack
(encryption) takes place. Indeed, once it is unpacked, ran-
somware’s payload goal is to explore the file system to find
files to encrypt. This search is done from the root of the file
system or directly from user’s folder with a depth-first or a
breadth-first search. As for the exploration phase, threads
that traverse the file system behave similarly and predictably,
enabling the possibility of an early detection of the ran-
somware and therefore deducing its family.
Themethodmentioned above can help a user to protect the
confidentiality and availability of his/her data while limiting
the probability of an attack and minimizing losses.
Outline. The context of the ransomware is presented in
section 2, including malware detection phases in section 2.2
and the state of the art in section 2.3. Prevention and detec-
tion mechanisms of ransomware are developed in section 3.
The results of the experiments are described in section 4.
Limitations are presented in section 6. Finally the conclusion
is drawn in section 7.
2 CONTEXT
2.1 Ransomware
Ransomware is a specific type of malware that locks the
access to user’s data or computer until a ransom is paid. Two
types of ransomware exist nowadays:
• Desktop locker that blocks users’ system without en-
crypting their files
• Cryptographic ransomware that encrypts user files
Cryptographic ransomware are themselves divided into mul-
tiple categories based on the cryptosystem used, like private-
key or public-key or hybrid.
Despite having diversified attack vectors, crypto-ransomware
typical infection process and payload execution is common
among all families as described in [5]. The classic crypto-
graphic ransomware behavior is described in Fig 1.
2.2 Malware detection phases
Malware analysis is useful in the following three phases.
The first one is related to prevention, i.e. avoiding to load a
Infection vector: spam emails, self-
propagation, drive-by downloads
1
Execution of malicious behavior
(by social engineering methods: dou-
ble click on a pdf file, on a malicious url)
2
File System Traversal: searching for files to
encrypt by depth-first or breadth-first search
3
Initiation of Encryption process
(specially doc, img, db, sec, arch files)
4
Deletion of the original files/Microsoft shadow volumes
(making recoverability nearly impossible)
5
Ransom payment (BitCoin or any Cryptocurrency)
6
Figure 1: Ransomware’s Workflow
malicious binary file. The second one is related to run time
behavior analysis, used to detect suspicious accesses. In that
option, malicious code has bypassed the prevention mech-
anism’s and the run time detection acts as a second line of
defence. The last one is related to post mortem analysis, also
known as forensic analysis. In this phase, the investigator
tries to characterize the malware and understand its capabil-
ity to bypass developed solution, to improve it. The first two
options are considered as preventive actions while the last
one is known as responsive action.
2.2.1 Prevention. Malware detection and prevention are
critical for connected devices’ protection across the Inter-
net. Antivirus software uses signature files and heuristics
to detect the threats. Traditional signature-based malware
detectors fail to recognize polymorphic malware since they
are obfuscated and zero-day executables. However, despite
having multiple code versions, some semantics of the origi-
nal malware are preserved such as its payload. Both static
and dynamic analysis are convenient techniques to extract
behavioral signature and classify malware.
2.2.2 Run Time analysis. Runtime malware analysis is
also known as Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Host based
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IDS collects and analyzes information gathered on a partic-
ular host or system, such as system logs, system processes,
files, or network interface. Typical analysis techniques con-
sist of function call/instruction trace monitoring and infor-
mation flow tracking. These techniques monitor the program
behavior during execution and potentially detect malware
variants. Yet, they have a high false positive rate and an
important performance overhead due to high resource de-
mands.
2.2.3 Forensic Analysis. When malware is discovered on
a system, before a shutdown, an analysis requires recon-
structing a vivid picture of events surrounding the malware
infection to gain a detailed understanding of the malware
itself. This process needs an access to the volatile memory
and logs if available. Malware can mitigate this dumping
process by deleting a section of code as soon as it has fin-
ished executing. This technique is known as stolen bytes.
These bytes must be restored if the dumped program is to
be run again. The memory snapshot is thus incomplete or
incoherent. The collected data can be used to understand the
infection process or to classify the malicious file thanks to
the data recovered in the memory.
2.3 State of the art
Previous contributions [6–12] are based on user space with
cryptographic hooks or kernel space with file system encryp-
tion detection mainly based on the Shannon entropy. Both
approaches suffer from false positives (e.g., compression) and
false negatives (e.g., static libraries, encryption preserving
the plaintext distribution). Moreover, the file system ran-
somware countermeasures [8, 9, 12] are impractical because
of performance loss and unusable through limited false posi-
tives evaluation. Despite excellent detection results (i.e., over
99%) with the existing countermeasures [8, 9, 11, 12], more
advanced ransomware will pass through. Indeed, very simple
and low cost techniques can be used to circumvent the state
of the art solutions as their authors have acknowledged.
The previous ad hoc countermeasures [8–12] rely mainly
on two features: the increase of Shannon entropy of the
user’s files and the cryptographic materials.
For historical reasons and practicality, the Microsoft’s
Cryptographic Application Programming Interface (Cryp-
toAPI) is used by diverse ransomware families to perform
file encryption. CryptoLocker and CryptoWall, use Microsoft
CryptoAPI to encrypt victims’ files. Chen et al., in [13] sug-
gest multiple classifiers (Random Forest, Support Vector Ma-
chine,etc.) to provide dynamic ransomware detection. To
sum up their work, various Application Programming Inter-
face (API) calls are collected when a software is executed
in a virtual machine, then a Call Flow Graph is built. Pre-
processing was made (normalization and feature selection)
to train aforementioned classifiers. Palisse et al. [10] and
Kolodenker et al. [11] each implemented a userland counter-
measure based on this observation. This monitoring enables
full control of key generation and encryption.
If backing up all the data is not possible, an individual can
back up the key used during encryption. PAYBREAK [11] is
at the heart of this idea. It is a proactive defence mechanism
consisting of three different components. They enable the
victim, bymeans of crypto function hooking to store different
keys used by ransomware in its encryption process in a key
vault. Later on, the victim can retrieve the key required for
decrypting the files. Yet, PAYBREAK does not resist to all
obfuscation threats.
Other features such as Hardware Performance Counters
(HPC) [14] seem to be a viable option for distinguishing be-
tween benign and malicious processes. HPC was passed to a
long-short-term-memory based auto-encoder for unsuper-
vised anomaly detection. Fast Fourier Transformation was
introduced to detect repetitive pattern of a ransomware that
is opening/closing/deleting/encrypting a file. Homayoun et
al. prefer using supervised learning algorithms (J48, Random
Forest, and Bagging) proceeded by sequential pattern mining
for software classification [15]. They rely on different pat-
terns to expose ransomware (Registry, DLL and File System
events).
A second approach exists and is based on file systemmoni-
toring through a driver in the kernel land. It has a very small
chance to be detected and disabled by the ransomware. The
file system drivers to date, monitor at least all the read and
write operations on the disk [8, 9, 12]. Then for each read
and write operation pre- or post-processing is performed
(e.g., Shannon entropy increase). Unfortunately, entropy fails
when trying to distinguish between encryption and other
operations such as compression. Another drawback of en-
tropy is its inability to detect developed attacks described in
Shukla et al.[16].
Findings of data-centric ransomware behavior in [8] re-
vealed that a precise type of search is performed in order to
encrypt victims’ files. In addition to that, recent ransomware
attacks were developed by Shukla et al [16] where they
shared a common event, which is the “enumeration of all
interesting files on volume”. The research presented in our
paper will extend this aspect making it a plausible feature
not only for ransomware detection but also for classification.
ShieldFS [12], the latest file systemminifilter driver, makes
use of a supervised classifier (i.e., random forest) trained with
six features to detect malicious activities on the disk. Excel-
lent detection rate (i.e., over 99%) is achieved by each ad hoc
countermeasure [8, 9, 11, 12]. But only few families have
been tested compared to the dataset found by the antivirus
companies. Moreover, we believe that more sophisticated
ransomware will easily defeat the countermeasures [8–12].
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At the outset, ransomware is capable of making use of the
Intel AES-NI instructions [17] and thus passes through [10,
11]. Monitoring the disk activity with a file system driver
seems to be the most promising approach for the live solu-
tions, as [8, 9, 12] proceeded.
To compete in the arms race of ransomware, numerous
behavioral aforementioned traits and others such as change
of mime type and Shannon entropy are at our disposal. Our
paper delves into file system traversal since, to the best of
our knowledge, this approach has not been explored by re-
searchers as an intrusion detection tool of ransomware. In its
second part, the paper targets the fine distinction between
ransomware’s and benign process occurrence. As stated in
[18], normal behavior has a high probability of occurrence
compared to anomalies which have a low probability that
stays below a certain threshold.
3 PREVENTION CAPABILITIES
Any prevention tool must be able to classify a given binary
as suspicious or not. For this purpose, static or dynamic anal-
ysis can be used. Nevertheless, modern malware employs
stealthy techniques in an attempt to remain undetected on
diverse systems making it difficult to analyze. Static analysis
may quickly reveal the presence of obfuscation (e.g., pack-
ing, virtualization) or other high level anti-static analysis
techniques. Thus, static analysis may reveal just a glimpse of
beneficial information to the analyst. For dynamic analysis
mitigation, malware has the opportunity to examine the en-
vironment it is running in and alter its behavior if it detects
an ongoing dynamic analysis.
To avoid these pitfalls, a new defence mechanism against
ransomware is developed. Our approach does not rely on
code examination, code structure or access to system’s calls.
A module that analyses suspicious software behavior is de-
signed while accessing the file system. All ransomware of
our provided collection, except one, evaluate users’ data by
traversing all folders except for some specific ones. Some
ransomware avoid certain folders which is a signature of
their original code. For this reason, execution traces and in
particular traversal’s order and avoided folders are collected.
In this section, different models to detect ransomware’s
attacks are presented. The novelty is the need of exclusively
one information: file system traversal. Moreover, an accurate
classification can be drawn with these observations. Thus
any binary can be flagged as malicious or not.
3.1 Black- and Whitelists
Nowadays, most of the ransomware families available in
multiple online databases implement a naive exploration
of the file system. In other words, they explore the file sys-
tem with well-known algorithms: depth-first or breadth-first
search. Nevertheless, slight differences between them can be
seen. Black- and whitelists of folders are embedded by ran-
somware’s authors into malicious binaries. They represent
two ways of filtering access to folders. Whitelists represent
a set of folders that can be accessed by a ransomware. For
example, a Cerber sample especially targets multimedia fold-
ers (e.g., C:/program files (x86)/steam/). Whereas blacklists
is the reverse of whitelists: folders that are omitted and de-
nied from ransomware’s path. For instance, C:/Windows/
system folders are avoided by malware to let the machine
run normally. Finally, the environment variables allow the
attacker to directly attack users’ documents rather than be-
ginning the exploration from the root as most of the analyzed
ransomware do. The above information will be used for ran-
somware detection in the following parts.
3.2 Decoy score
The first prevention mechanism we suggest relies on the
idea that ransomware, intrusively or passively, scans specific
files and folders that enable not only their detection but
also categorization[19]. In fact, some directories and files are
rarely visited by the user or by one of the system’s regular
tools and thus can be considered as a trap. If these files
are manipulated by a software it can indicate an illegal and






Figure 2: The list of decoy folders used to compute the
per-thread score.
The main algorithm is the following:
Algorithm 1 Ransomware Detection
1: procedure
2: def detect_suspicious_behavior(thread, threshold):
3: label_array ← {Decoy Folders}
4: score_array ← {false, false, false, false, false}
5: for path ∈ thread.paths do
6: if path ∈ label_array then
7: index ← label_array.index(path)
8: score_array[index] ← true




Our suggested solution checks if a thread passes in spe-
cific folders. If so, it marks them and then increments the
decoy folder counter. The final score is normalized (i.e., di-
vided by the number of “decoy folders” that was added in
the beginning), in case the threshold is reached, the thread is
recognized as malicious. The detailed algorithm is presented
in Algorithm 1. It is unlikely that a normal thread will pass
through at least 3 of these Decoy Folders. This is why the
threshold has been set to 0.6. If it is lower some ransomware
will not be detected (for example if a ransomware directly
modifies the file it will not go through bin recycle), in ad-
dition, many benign threads will be flagged. If it is greater,
others will also escape detection.
3.3 Graph Similarity
Each ransomware’s file system traversal can be compared to
others in order to know if they belong to the same family, or
if they share some code concerning the paths exploration.
As a first step, we build a graph of the explored folders for
each sample. Then, the similarity matrix corresponding to
the ransomware dataset is computed seen in Figure 3. Finally,
a classification of the samples is done based on the similar-
ity matrix using hierarchical clustering technique, which
provides us a dendrogram.
3.3.1 Hierarchical Graph. All machines used to collect
the data from the bare metal platform have the same config-
uration and a similar hardware. Each line of raw data used in
the experiment correspond to the nature of the operation on
the file system (read file and open directory), the thread pid
and a time stamp. This data is enough to trace the complete
graph traversal even if the write operation is useless for this
phase.
Each node represents a file system folder that has been
opened by a suspicious thread. File system traversals are
represented as oriented graphs (via time stamps). Edges rep-
resent transition from parent to child folders. In order to be
scalable (i.e., graph size) and generic (i.e., distinct Windows
installations), subgraphs have been pruned at specific file
system positions (e.g., C:/Program_Files/). The number of
pruned sub-folders is stored within the graphs’ edges.
A graph is defined as the tuple G = (V , E, µ,ν ) where:
• V the set of nodes
• E the set of edges
• η the set of nodes not pruned covered by a ransomware
• θ the set of paired nodes with the number of pruned
sub-folders
• µ : V → η
• ν : E → θ
3.3.2 Adjacency similarity. A comparison between a given
trace (i.e. a graph) with other graphs is needed. In this case,
graph (or sub-graph) homomorphism is not a viable solution.
Each version of a malware can exclude some paths leading
to a slightly different graph. The concept of matching cost
to penalize structural differences is introduced. The closer
the structures of the two graphs are, the lower the cost to
match them. Graph similarity techniques can be classified
into three main categories: edit distance/graph isomorphism,
feature extraction, and iterative methods [20]. The drawback
of graph isomorphism is that the algorithms are exponen-
tial and, thus, not applicable to the large graphs that are
of interest to us. The feature extraction approach relies on
graph properties such as degree distribution, diameter, etc.
This method scales well, but depending on the metrics that
are chosen, it is possible to get high similarity between two
graphs that have very different node set size. Iterative meth-
ods are based on the fact that two nodes are similar if their
neighbourhoods are also similar. This latter method is chosen
using an adjacency similarity algorithm.
To compute the similarity matrix between all the graphs,
Graph-tool [21] has been used. It is a free framework for
creating and manipulating graphs. The core of this frame-
work is written in C + + which makes it fast even for large
graphs. A built-in Graph-tool function computes the adja-
cency similarity between two graphs. It corresponds to the
number of edges that have the same source and destination
in both graphs. The labels of vertices are used to build the ad-
jacency matrices and thus make the comparison. The higher
the score is, the higher the similarity.
3.3.3 Classification. Then, to classify the samples, unsu-
pervised hierarchical clustering over this similarity matrix is
used. A dendrogram is used to represent the classification. It
is a visual representation of the compound correlation data.
The individual compounds are arranged along the bottom
of the dendrogram and referred to as leaf nodes. Compound
clusters are formed by joining individual compounds or ex-
isting compound clusters with the join point referred to as
a node. The leafs of the tree are the name of the classified
ransomware.
3.4 Supervised Machine Learning
In this section, an improvement of the previous classification
is made by using a supervised approach. Thread level gran-
ularity is maintained throughout the whole experiment. In
addition to the access to previously mentioned decoy folders
in Figure 2, other features were taken into consideration to
perform a supervised learning on the collected information.
This method is not limited to file system’s traversal but
overall and per decoy folder velocity is taken into considera-
tion. In fact, it is not sufficient that a thread explores only
decoy folders to be marked as malicious, the time spent in
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each decoy folder and in total is crucial and needs to be
considered for a better classification.
Paths_total Total number of explored paths
Time_total The file systems traversal duration
{Decoy_folder}_paths The number of subfolders ex-
plored in the current decoy folder
(Updated Decoy Folders: Recy-
cle_bin, Perf_log,Windows, Python,
Prog_data, Prog_files, Recovery)
{Decoy_folder}_time The timestamp of the first subfolder
explored in the current decoy folder
Table 1: The list of features used to train the classifiers.
3.5 File System Traversal Velocity
Another behavioral property is additionally investigated, the
execution time (the velocity of the file traversal) of a fam-
ily. Indeed, the samples issued from the same families have
similar patterns. Each payload can be packed or obfuscated
individually, but the system impact will remain the same for
a particular family with the exception of new versions.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1 Data Collection
Needed data is collected from an automated bare metal mal-
ware analysis platform built from scratch. This data is repre-
sented in the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) format and
provides, for each userland thread of the system, a complete
list of explored folders. Similar to [8, 9, 12], a file system dri-
ver is used to monitor the runtime behavior of each thread.
A crawler downloads a ransomware from well-known
databases, then it is executed on windows 7/10 machines
for a period of 15 minutes. A dump corresponding to this
malware behavior is saved for analysis.
Moreover, during the analysis, thread’s write operations
are passed through an indicator of compromise: Shannon’s
entropy. As a result, within each dump, malicious threads
are explicitly marked. A manual verification of all threads
marked as malicious for all the dumps is then implemented
(e.g., eliminates the false positives). The ransomware collec-
tion contains more than 700 active ransomware spread to
across twenty families.
Sample labelling is achieved through Avclass tool [22]
and VirusTotal [23]. A bare metal platform has been pre-
ferred to the solutions based on virtualization because of the
numerous techniques used by the malware to fingerprint
well-known sandboxes(e.g., Cuckoo Sandbox [24]). For the
time being, the countermeasure presented in this paper is
post-mortem (i.e., based on the sandbox analysis), however
it could be incorporated into a live solution.
Benign data is collected from various users utilizing their
computers for work purposes. Technically speaking, the in-
formation gathered corresponds to web browsing, software
development, file encryption. . . The same information is col-
lected for benign and malicious software: Files Traversed by
threads.
For scalability reasons, parallel machines could be used to
perform the tests as well as an improved disk image distri-
bution.
4.2 Data set
4.2.1 Training Dataset. As previously mentioned, 770 ac-
tive ransomware were executed on Windows OS both 7 and
10. However, 76 ransomware’s binary hash corresponded to
multiple ransomware categories such as Yakes or Teslacrypt
or Shade and Barys. Therefore, these records are omitted
from ransomwares family classification during the super-
vised learning phase. They serve as ID specific to each family
of ransomware. For example,(1eb412a5f6400eb490a8698dc08129da)
hash or (46b9fc70dc137c0d978ce16364a15c27) hash.
Since the overall database of malware collection contains
694 active ransomware, 417 ransomware records were used
to act as training set completed with 417 records of benign
computer usage. Benign data is collected on Windows 10
computers where a user is usually surfing the Internet, play-
ing online games, developing a software, etc. They corre-























Table 2: An overview of the active ransomware fami-
lies and goodwares used in the experiments, ranked in
descending order according to their samples number.
The holdout method is used to evaluate different super-
vised machine learning models. In order to apply those algo-
rithms and evaluate their performance, Python [25] is used.
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More specifically, scikit-learn library since it represents an
efficient tool for data mining and data analysis. In our case
classification and clustering [26]. Avoiding overfitting on the
non malicious threads is crucial to have better results which
will enable us to generalize our model.
4.2.2 Learning Phase. The training set also consists of
equally partitioned data across all families of ransomware
and different types of benign processes. The same distribu-
tion is kept to remove any bias in the data. Multiple classi-
fiers have been trained: k-nearest neighbors [27], decision
tree [28] and random forest [29]. The decision tree builds
a graph-tree based on the features and gives a result with
the output variable (i.e., malicious or benign) on the leaf,
whereas random forest builds decision trees with a subset of
the features selected randomly. The final result is given with
a majority vote.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Decoy Folders. The objective in this first detection
mechanism is a binary classification of a record: benign or
malicious. 99.35% of malicious threads are correctly detected.
It highlights the fact that the majority of the ransomware
collection begins file system’s exploration from the hard disk
root. Less than 1% of benign data have been classified as
malicious.
Figure 3: Malicious threads file system’s traversal sim-
ilarity matrix
4.3.2 Ransomware’s Graph. The computation for all pairs
of graphs, gives a similarity matrix as represented in Figure
3. A dozen of ransomware groups (i.e., families) can be seen.
Two groups represent 80% of the file systems traversal dis-
tribution. However, 10% of the samples are uncorrelated to
others (i.e., the blue block). The distance matrix shows that
ransomware up to date have little diversity concerning the
file system’s exploration. This can be explained by the fact
that most of them use the Windows API for accessing the
files.
We used the Avclass tool [22] to obtain the labels of the
evaluated binaries. We present here a partial view of the
dendrogram (12 classified over the ransomware samples).
We can notice that the TeslaCrypt and the bitman are very
close. This means that they share the same traversal algo-
rithm, white list and black list. Another similarity is between
Cerber and Zerber ransomware. The latter can be considered
as a simple variant of the first.
Figure 4: Families Graphical classification dendro-
gram
The (partial) dendrogram presented in Figure 4, shows
that samples of the same family are successfully grouped on
the same branch. The families that are closed to each other
are also grouped together (i.e., same branch).
But a difference is still noteworthy. That indicates that
ransomware can be classified according to their file systems
traversal, even when thin differences are present between
families. In the next section, another feature is used to clas-
sify the samples into families.








4.3.3 Supervised Learning. All of the supervised learning
algorithms are able to distinguish between a ransomware and
benign application file system traversal as seen in Table 3.
Binary classification ( benign vs ransomware) is efficient
in this case. However, to take one step further than the de-
coy folder detection, an analysis of ransomware families
is carried out. For the Random Forest Classifier, 68.63 % of
malicious records were correctly classified as so: a binary
is no longer flagged as benign or malicious, we were also
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Supervised Learning Algorithm True Positive Rate True Negative Rate False Positive Rate False Negative Rate Training Time (seconds)
K nearest neighbor (n=3) 97.67 97.11 2.89 2.33 0.0039
Decision Tree 100 100 0 0 0.0095
Random Forest 100 100 0 0 0.0611
Gaussian naive bayes 100 97.47 2.53 0 0.0146

















Figure 5: Xorist’s File Traversal Subgraph
able to identify ransomware’s family (eg. Locky, Yakes). In-
deed, there’s a similarity between Bitman and Teslacrypt
ransomware on one hand, and Zerber and Cerber on the
other hand. The main reason behind this correlation is that
they belong to the same family, thus will most probably be-
have in similar ways to traverse the file system and encrypt
their files. Decision Tree Classifier achieved a 61.25 % of
correct ransomware classification.
Figure 6 illustrates decision tree’s rules to perform the
split, thus to classify the records. It is limited to 4 leaf nodes
to be able to represent it. Indeed, normal application does not
pass constantly through those decoy folders. The majority of
benign records have non negligible values in the Prog_Files
time and Windows_time. It shows the time spent by some
applications such as firefox.exe or explorer.exe in those decoy
folders.
The similarity between a Teslacrypt and Bitman’s execu-
tion is shown through the records presented in Table 4.
family Bitman Teslacrypt Normal
nb_paths 8199 8199 8
time_total 996315740 987726399 872039
RECYCLE_BIN_aggreg 2 2 0
RECYCLE_BIN_time 1460 3799 0
PERF_LOG_aggreg 1 1 0
PERF_LOG_time 4742522 4274485 0
PYTHON_aggreg 266 266 0
PYTHON_time 4987588 4519400 0
PROG_DATA_aggreg 188 188 5
PROG_DATA_time 131810705 132116153 772436
PROG_FILES_aggreg 0 0 1
PROG_FILES_time 0 0 455083
WINDOWS_aggreg 0 0 2
WINDOWS_time 0 0 450114
RECOVERY_aggreg 2 2 0
RECOVERY_time 131625192 131958939 0
Table 4: Benign and Ransom Records
PERF_LOG_time <= 5710.5
samples = 833
value = [59, 79, 1, 3, 13, 1, 1, 6, 6, 7, 1, 7, 1, 1, 416, 1, 1
1, 4, 3, 2, 115, 1, 1, 74, 13, 13, 2]
416
[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 416, 0, 0, 0




[59, 79, 1, 3, 13, 1, 1, 6, 6, 7, 1, 7, 1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1
4, 3, 2, 115, 1, 1, 74, 13, 13, 2]
False
245
[59, 0, 1, 3, 13, 1, 1, 6, 6, 6, 0, 7, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0
4, 3, 2, 115, 1, 0, 0, 13, 0, 2]
nb_paths <= 22160.5
172
[0, 79, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 74, 0, 13, 0]
78
[0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 74, 0, 0, 0]
94
[0, 76, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13, 0]
Figure 6: Decision Tree Classification Parameters
4.3.4 File System Traversal Velocity. Figure 7 illustrates
such statement for the xorist malware. Figure 8 demon-
strates the bitman malware. We can observe that two imple-
mentations of the file traversal algorithm exist.
The raw data used in the experiment have been gathered
from the same machines. These tests were made from a
8
Figure 7: The file system’s traversal velocity of the 125
Xorist samples
sample of the available database. The time unit is the perfor-
mance counter value (i.e., OS internal) in units of processor
ticks since the beginning of the session which is compa-
rable across the analyses. The speed depends on the ran-
somware design. As an example, the Cerber family searches
files in one thread and encrypts them in another, whereas,
the xorist family uses the same thread to search and en-
crypt the files. Moreover, the programming or compiling
choices cause some differences at runtime. To conclude, the
velocity indicator provides an additional signature to distin-
guish between ransomware families. For other uninfected
applications, no multiple file opening is shown.
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6 LIMITATIONS
Since ransomware behave similarly in the file system tra-
versal, more features need to be taken into consideration
for families classification. In addition to that, any software
that mimics the behavior of ransomware’s traversal will be
classified as malicious so our proposal raises false positives
in this case. Another limitation occurs when no file system
traversal is done prior any encryption.
Figure 8: The file system’s traversal velocity of the 57
bitman samples
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we were able to detect ransomware behavior
based only on monitoring file system traversal. We concluded
that the majority of ransomware start their encryption pro-
cess from the root of the hard disk. To get a precise ran-
somware’s classification, machine learning techniques were
used. Based only on decoy folders, we were able to detect
ransomware from various families. As for our future work,
we will gather additional features to be able to distinguish
accurately between various ransomware families even if they
share some specific behaviors such as file system traversal
noticed for example between the Cerber and Zerber fami-
lies. Furthermore, a signature of each ransomware could be
extracted.
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